THE RECENT PROPERTY LEGISLATION IN ENGLAND
It is difficult for English lawyers to grasp the effect of the
recent statutes which came into operation on January ist last and
which have gone far towards revolutionizing the old law of real
property. Even mature practitioners are more or less at sea for
the moment and the last six months have witnessed a curious
spectacle of lecture classes presided over by enterprising barristers for the benefit of the other branch of the profession. Solicitors grumble that they are at school again. Innumerable
questions are addressed each week to the technical journals by perplexed practitioners, and even the Lord Chancellor himself has
been heckled on the woolsack by noble but querulous Lords. If
this is the state of affairs in England, the present 'vriter may
surely be excused a little self-pity in the task which must be attempted in the following pages, the task, that is to say, of presenting an intelligible epitome of the new Acts for the benefit of
American lawyers who are necessarily, and happily, unfamiliar
with some of the worst technicalities of the old system of land
law in England. An attempt, however, will be made to indicate
the broad outline of the legislation.
First, we must say a word about the history of the legislation, for though our chief concern is with the six Acts passed in
1925, it must not be thought that all the changes which they introduce are new ideas that have occurred to conveyancers since the
War. To discover the origin of some of the new enactments we
have to go back to 1897. In that year Lord Davey introduced a
Conveyancing Bill into the House of Lords which contained the
germ of the present legislation in that it adumbrated the idea of
having only two legal estates, namely, the fee simple and the term
of years. It also provided that a transfer of land should carry
the whole fee simple or the whole term, subject to what were
called paramount rights, such as easements, but free from fiduciary rights, such as the rights of beneficiaries under a trust. Other
points of interest in the Bill were that the owner of a legal estate
was called an "estate owner," the fee simple of settled land was
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made to vest in the tenant for life, and any tenant in common
could procure an order vesting the land in trustees for sale. We
shall see all these points cropping up in the 1925 Acts. The Bill,
however, after having been read a second time, was dropped.
Then, in i9o9, a Royal Commission was set up with the object of
ascertaining whether it was advisable to extend the system of
compulsory registration. But the conclusion reached by the Commission in i9xi was that instead of extending registration, the
right plan was to simplify the existing law of real property, and
among the suggestions put forward were the compulsory enfranchisement of copyholds and the abolition of the rule requiring words of limitation.
The next stage was reached in 1913 when Lord Haldane
brought forward his Conveyancing Bill and Real Property Bil.
The former, inter alia, divided interests in land into "proprietary
interests" (legal and equitable fees simple and terms of years absolute) ; "paramount interests" (easements, etc.); and "subordinate interests" (rights of beneficiaries) -a terminology which was
connected with an extension of what is called the "curtain principle," that is, a conveyance by a "proprietor" was to be subject
to paramount interests but was to over-reach subordinate interests unless protected by cautions. The Real Property Bill enacted
a number of changes which appeared in the 1925 Acts, including
the abolition of copyholds and perpetually renewable leases and
words of limitation. The Bills, however, disappeared in the fog
of war.
The last stage begins with the end of the War. In i919
there was issued the Fourth Report of the Acquisition and Valuation of Land Committee, the terms of whose reference were "To
consider the present position of land transfer, and to advise what
action should be taken to facilitate and cheapen the transfer of
land." Now the suggestion which had the greatest influence upon
the deliberations of the Committee and which must be grasped
by anyone who desires to appreciate the main drift of the ensuing
legislation, was that put forward by Sir Arthur Underhill in a
pamphlet entitled, "The Line of Least Resistance." The object
desired by all was to simplify conveyancing and the only problem
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was to discover the easiest method of attainment. Sir Arthur
Underhill pointed out that the complications which attended the
transfer of land were principally due to the complexities of real
property law. That law, as the result of old feudal doctrines,
imposed upon us three distinct systems of land law. There was
the law of freeholds, which was overlaid with much difficult
learning about estates, seisin, contingent remainders, executory
interests under the Statute of Uses, and so on; there was the law
relating to leaseholds which was far less complicated because, being unaffected by the doctrine of estates, it only admitted of absolute ownership in much the same way as stocks and shares did;
and lastly, there was the law of copyholds which, in several important respects, was different both from the law of freeholds
and the law of leaseholds. Therefore, advocated Sir Arthur
Underhill, all that was necessary in order to put land transfer
upon a more sensible footing was, first, to turn copyholds into
freeholds, and then to enact that the law which applied to leaseholds should also apply to freeholds. In other words, first get
rid of the copyholds and then assimilate realty and personalty.
He advised that after the abolition of copyholds the main design
could be effected by passing a short Act to pio.vide that a fee
simple estate should for all purposes of disposition, settlement on
persons in succession, transmission, devolution, distribution and
administration of assets on death, have all the incidents of a chattel real estate, save only that it should continue in perpetuity.
This general principle was adopted by the Committee and Sir
Benjamin Cherry was instructed to embody it in a draft BilL
The ultimate result, however, of the draftsman's labors was not a
Short Act as contemplated by Sir Arthur Underhill, but the Law
of Property Act, 1922 which, besides incorporating the assimilating principle, adopted many of the revolutionary ideas contained
in Lord Haldane's Bills and effected many incidental amendments of the existing Conveyancing, Settled Land, Trustee and
Land Transfer Acts.
This 1922 Act ran to over three hundred pages, but, in the
course of its passage through Parliament, an assurance was given
that it should later be split up into a number of separate Acts

770

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

which should not only put the changes in the appropriate enactment but should also consolidate the existing statute law of real
property. When this consolidating process was begun it was
found necessary to appoint another committee to consider what
further amendments of the old law were necessary in order to
bring the new ideas of the 1922 Act into l.ine with the existing statutes. This proved a troublesome matter but, to cut a long story
short, the course of ensuing legislation was as follows. In the first
place the coming into operation of the Law of Property Act, 1922,
was postponed to January I, 1926. The Law of Property
(Amendment) Act, 1924, was then passed which did two thingsit repealed all but the transitional provisions of the 1922 Act, and
it set out the new provisions which were to take the place of the
repealed portions. Then, in 1925, there were passed the Law of
Property Act, the Settled Land Act, the Land Charges Act, -the
Administration of Estates Act, the Land Registration Act, and
the Trustee Act. These 1925 Acts brought up to date all the old
Acts bearing similar titles and incorporated in them the alterations introduced by the 1922 Act as amended by the 1924 Act.
To discover, then, the-existing statute law of real property, we go
to the unrepealed parts of the Law of Property Act, 1922 (i. e.,
Parts v and vi and Schedules 12-15, dealing with the abolition of
copyholds and perpetually renewable leases, and the extinguishment of manorial incidents) and to the six 1925 Acts. All of
these came into operation on the first of January last.
We have seen what the general idea of all this legislation is.
It is to turn copyholds into freeholds and then to assimilate freeholds and leaseholds. Let us see quite briefly how these two
objects have been attained.
As regards the first point, it may be said with some degree of
assurance that all tenures have now been reduced to one common
form, namely, socage. Copyhold tenure became automatically
converted into free and common socage on January I, 1926. All

those variations on the general law such as gavelkind and Borough
English, have also been abolished. It was intended to abolish
Frankalmoin but, owing to the peculiar manner in which the matter was dealt with, it is doubtful whether the abolition is effective.
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The honorary services, where they exist, incident to land held
by grand and petty sergeantry are retained. Escheat is replaced
by the right of the Crown to take land as bona vacantia. In other
words, though the doctrine that every acre of land is not owned
but is held of King still remains true, it has no practical effect,
for all land is held by socage tenure and socage tenure is only
another expression for absolute ownership. The. direct results
of feudalism have at last disappeared. The subject of copyholds
does not, however, end with the- conversion into freehold, for
copyhold tenure involved certain manorial incidents which were
of considerable pecuniary value to the lord of a manor. It is
therefore provided that within the next ten years arrangements
must be made between the lord and tenant for the payment to the
former of compensation for the loss of such incidents as bear a
money value. When such compensation is fixed, the manorial
incidents are extinguished.
We can now turn to the assimilating provisions." It should
be remembered here that the 1925 Acts only complete a process
which has been continuing for centuries, for the tendency has
always been to extend the law of leaseholds to real property, a
fact which can be appreciated if one considers such matters as
the remedies for dispossession, the power of testamentary disposition, the availability of property for creditors and its devolution to personal representatives. But the process has now been
carried as far as is humanly possible, and the differences which
still existed in 1925 between the law applicable to freeholds and
that applicable to leaseholds have been swept away. Perhaps the
most important point upon which assimilation has been attained
is in connection with the quantum and nature of the interest
which can be created in the two forms of property. As regards
real property in the strict sense the rule prior to 1926, both at
common law and in equity, was that land was not the subject of
ownership but only of tenure. A person who, in the popular
sense, owned land did not really own it but was the holder of an
estate therein. But the number of estates which might subsist,
either at law or in equity, was fairly considerable, and moreover
it was possible to take the legal fee simple and to carve it into a
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number of partial and successive legal estates in the form either
of remainders or executory interests. The position with regard to
personalty was different. At common law pure personalty or
existing leaseholds were the subjects only of absolute ownership
and they could not be carved into estates. There could be no limitation of partial and successive interests either by way of remainder or a grant to uses. Equity, on the other hand, did allow
personalty to be split up to a limited extent into a series of successive interests if the legal ownership was vested in trustees and
a settlement made of the equitable interest, but yet it was quite
impossible even in equity to limit an estate tail. in personalty.
Thus in personalty it was impossible to have legal life estates, it
was possible to have equitable life estates; it was impossible to
have legal or equitable estates tail. All this is now changed. It
is enacted that the only legal estates which can be created in land
are the fee simple absolute in possession and the term of years
absolute, although the term "legal interests" has been adopted to
cover such interests as easements and rent-charges provided that
they are held in perpetuity or for a term of years absolute. Thus
the old life estates, estates tail, whether in possession or remainder, are no longer legal estates but, to adopt the new terminology,
equitable interests. Again, it is expressly enacted that entailed
interests can be created either in chattels real or chattels personal.
The results under this head, then, are that the same partial estates can be created in personalty as could formerly have been
created in realty, and that, whether created in realty or personalty,
they must always be equitable in nature.
We must pass hurriedly over the other points of assimilation, and perhaps it will help if we present them in tabular form.
(i)

DESCENT ON INTESTACY

Before 1926 there was one set of intestate rules for the fee
simple and another for chattels real and personal. Both these
have been abolished except with regard to the descent of entailed
interests, and a new set invented and made applicable to realty
and personalty. Both forms of property will now be sold and
the proceeds distributed in accordance with a uniform set of rules.
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(2)

ORDER IN WIIICH ASSETS ARE APPLIED IN PAYMENT
OF DEBTS

In the case of a person who died before 1926, the order in
which his property was taken in order to satisfy the claims of
his creditors was based upon the distinction between realty and
personalty, the general principle being that the general personal
estate was the primary fund. A new order has now been devised which puts realty and personalty on the same footing.*

(3)

WORDS OF LIMITATION

It was necessary under the old law to use technical words of
limitation in the conveyance of a fee simple estate, but a grant
of a leasehold carried the whole interest of the grantor even
though no special words were used. It is now provided that a
conveyance of freehold lands without words of limitation shall
pass the fee simple or other whole estate which the grantor has
power to convey unless a contrary intention appears in the conveyance.
(4) METHOD OF CREATING MORTGAGES
Mortgages of the fee simple must now be created by means
of a lease for a term of years just as, in the past, mortgage of a
leasehold interest was made, in most cases, by means of sublease.

(5)

THE RULE IN DEARLE v. HALL

The rule, prior to 1926, was that if there were several mortgages or assignments of an equitable interest in land, the priorities as between the various assignees depended on the order of
time in which they had acquired their rights; but that if the subject-matter was an equitable interest in pure personalty, then the
priorities were settled by the order in which the assignees had
given notice of the transaction to the trustees or other legal owner
of the fund. This last rule, known as the rule in Dearle v. Hall,
has now been extended to dealings with equitable interests in freeholds and leaseholds.
So much, then, for the assimilating provisions. But there
is unfortunately more to be said before we can gain even a faint
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idea of the extent of the changes wrought. The changes which
we have already noticed have not been made in order to satisfy the
dictates of logic and orderliness but simply and solely to the end
that the transfer of land may be cheapened and facilitated. It
is in this very matter of transfer that the difference between land
and pure personalty is perhaps most marked. If we contrast the
procedure which takes place upon the sale of land with that which
obtains on the sale of stock, we cannot but agree with the layman
that the result is very much in favor of the latter. The layman
complains that it is more troublesome to convey a plot of land
worth £5o0 than it is to transfer a hundred thousand pounds
worth of shares. This is true in general and it is conceived that it
must always remain true for the simple reason that the physical
differences between the two forms of property produce an entirely different situation in law. From a conveyancing point of
view land is distinct from goods and stock in two main particulars. In the first place it is seldom safe for a purchaser to conclude that the person who is ready to sell him the land is the fee
simple owner, for it may very well be that, despite his position as
apparent owner, the vendor may possess a mere life interest or
term of years. Secondly, land, owing to the permanent qualities
which it possesses, is more often that not subject to what, for
Avant of a better term, we may call third party rights,-rights, that
is, which may continue to be enforceable against a purchaser.
Easements, restrictive covenants, rent-charges, equitable charges,
rights of beneficiaries under a settlement-all these are examples
of the danger which besets the path of the intending purchaser.
For these reasons, then, it is necessary that the purchaser should
investigate with some care the title of the vendor, and it is investigation of title, together with the doctrine of constructive notice,
which increases the cost and delay of land transfer and arouses the
fury of laymen. The matter is not nearly as complicated in the
matter of the transfer of stock. Here the owner whose name is
entered on the Register is the legal owner; the stock may be held
by the registered owner as trustee for others but no such equities.
are allowed to be entered on the register; a purchaser will be safe
in dealing with the registered owner and he will take a title free
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from the equitable interests of third parties. A curtain, as it
were, consisting of the Register, is raised between the purchaser
and the beneficiaries. Their concern is not with him but with the
person who has received the money.
Why should not the conveyance of land be made as simple
as the transfer of stock? We take the answer to be that land is
peculiarly subject to third party rights some of which cannot be
transferred to the purchase money but must remain enforceable
against the land. A system of compulsory registration of title
might, of course, be introduced, but the English seem determined
to retain their practice of private conveyancing, and while this is
the feeling of the country all that the legislature can do is to improve matters by extending to transfers of land the principles
which are applicable to the transfers of stock in-all cases where
the land is subject to third party rights. This the 1925 Acts have
attempted to do. No vital alteration in procedure has been introduced where the land to be conveyed is vested for an unincumbered fee simple in an absolute beneficial owner. But wherever
the land which is the subject of the transfer is subjeet to third
party equitable rights in such a way that under the old practice a
purchaser would be obliged to enter into a lengthy investigation
of title (as in the case of strict settlements), or wherever the pur-.
chaser would, under the doctrine of notice, have taken the legal
state subject to some outstanding equity, new provisions have been
introduced which enable a vendor to pass a title to the legal estate free from such third party rights as can be made enforceable
against the purchase money instead of against the land, and free
from any obligation on the part of the purchaser to investigate
any third party rights. These rights are over-reached by the conveyance and bec6me enforceable only against the trustees into
whose hands the purchase money must be paid. Thus we approach more nearly to the practice which obtains on the transfer
of stock. There are four main principles which may be singled
out as responsible for this result.
First, as we have seen, the number of legal estates is reduced to two. One effect of this is that although it is still law
that a purchaser is bound by legal estates affecting the title con-

776

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA TAW REVIEW

veyed to him whether he has notice or not, yet there are fewer
estates which can exist as legal estates and therefore fewer to
which a purchaser must be liable.
Secondly, provision is made that, no matter what limitations
may have been raised of the land, the legal fee simple shall always be vested in somebody capable of transferring the same. In
other words the basis of conveyancing has been shifted from
powers to estates. Under the old law, for example, a tenant for
life under a strict settlement was empowered to convey the fee
simple to a purchaser but he did this by virtue of the statutory
power conferred upon him by the Settled Land Acts. Now he
does it, not by virtue of a power, but because the legal fee simple
is actually vested in him.
Thirdly, the principle of registration has been extended.
Not registration of title, be it noted, but of third party rights.
The Acts allow practically every equitable interest that can exist
to be registered as a land charge, and enact that registration shall
constitute notice, but that absence of registration shall render the
interest unenforceable even against a purchaser who had actual
notice of its existence.
Fourthly, the curtain principle has been extended. Under
the old law the rule was, that wherever land had been conveyed to
trustees in trust for sale, the trustees could pass the legal estate to
a purchaser free from the equitable rights of the beneficiaries in
the proceeds of the sale. This over-reaching principle has been
extended in two directions. There are certain cases (e. g., where
land has been granted to tenants in common) in which a trust for
sale automatically arises, so as to admit of the legal estate being
conveyed free from the equitable rights of the tenants in common.
Again, an owner of land whose estate is not subject to a settlement or trust for sale, but is subject to some equitable right, such
as a rent-charge for life, vested in a third party, is -.allowed
within certain limits to create a trust for sale ad hoc and thus to
pass the fee simple free from the equitable right.
There are a few further points, designed to carry out the
above principle, which may be briefly noted.
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(I) MORTGAGES

One principle of the new legislation is that the legal fee simple should always be vested in the real owner. In the case of
mortgages of the fee simple, the result of the method of creation"
adopted under the old law and of the maxim, "once a mortgage
always a mortgage," was that though the mortgagor was the real
owner, the legal estate was vested in the mortgagee. It is now impossible to make a mortgage by a conveyance of the fee simple.
Two methods alone of creating legal mortgages are allowed. The
borrower must either demise the land for a long term of years or
he must grant a charge by way of legal mortgage, the result in
this last case being to give the mortgagee the same rights as if he
had taken a long term. Thus the mortgagor retains the legal fee
simple, the mortgagee takes a legal term of years absolute, while
subsequent mortgagees also take legal estates, i. e., each takes a
term of years absolute one day longer than the term held by the
immediately preceding mortgagee. Although he only possesses a
term, a mortgagee when exercising his power of sale is enabled
to pass a legal fee simple. Any person who possesses a legal or
equitable mortgage affecting a legal estate may register the mortgage as a land charge unless he holds the title deeds, and the priorities of such mortgagees depend upon the order of registration.
(2) STRICT SETTLEMENTS

In order to simplify the task of investigating title, a new
method has been instituted for the creation of strict settlements.
All such settlements must now be created by two distinct deeds.
First, there must be a "vesting deed" which vests the legal fee
simple in the tenant for life, describes the settled land, names the
trustees and the persons having power to appoint new trustees
and sets out any powers which may be exercised by the tenant
for life in addition to those conferred by the Settled Land Act.
Secondly, there is the "trust instrument" which declares the trusts
affecting the land, i. e., the life interest of the first tenant, the
widow's rent-charge, the portions and the entailed interests.
Thus the tenant for life appears in two different guises. For con-
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veyancing purposes he is the owner of the legal fee simple, while
for the purposes of beneficial enjoyment he is a mere life tenant.
When he makes a conveyance, in exercise of his power of sale, he
passes the fee simple because he has it, and he passes it free from
the rights of himself and the other equitable beneficiaries under
the settlement. The trust instrument is no longer abstracted,
the purchaser's concern being with the vesting deed alone. If
that deed contains the required particulars, the purchaser is
bound to assume that the person in whom the legal fee simple
is said to be vested is tenant for life and has the powers of tenant
for life; that the persons named as trustees are actually the trustees; and that the other statements in the deed were correct at
the date thereof. When a tenant for life dies, the legal fee simple
vests in the trustees as "special" personal representatives and is
transferred by them to the next tenant for life.

(3)

UNDIVIDED SHARES

A tenancy in common has always been a hindrance to conveyancing because of a purchaser's obligation to trace the title of
each tenant. This obligation is now removed for it is provided
that never again can there be a tenancy in common of a legal estate. If land is limited to A, B and C as tenants in common, the
legal estate vests in A, B and C as joi nt tenants in trust to sell and
to give effect to the equitable rights of A, B and C as tenants in
common. Thus a tenancy in common may still exist with regard
to the equitable interest but when it does it invariably produces
a joint legal tenancy. Joint tenants have one title and therefore a
tenancy in common is no longer an impediment to the transfer of
land.
(4)

FUTURE INTERESTS

That most difficult part of the old property law which dealt
with the limitation of future interests has been simplified beyond
all recognition. This is due to the repeal of the Statute of Uses
and to the fact that under the new classification of estates and
interests, all future interests must be equitable in nature. The result is that we are thrown back to the period before 1535, when
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the Chancellor allowed a person who put his lands in use complete liberty with regard to future limitations of the equitable interest. At the present day no future legal estate can be created
by way either of remainder or of a grant to uses, but a settlor or
devisor, provided that he creates a trust, can make what future
limitations he chooses within the limits prescribed by the Rule
against Perpetuities. The old common law rules for remainders
have gone, as also has the necessity to act under the Statute of
Uses in certain cases and there is no longer any difference between limitations in deeds and limitations in wills.
We must now bring to a close what is admittedly an inadequate endeavour to present an intelligible outline of the new Acts.
The subject is too vast for elucidation in one article and there are
several points of interest-such as the new power to devise entailed interests and the abolition of the Rule in Shelley's Casewhich have not been described, but if enough has been said to
stimulate the interest of American lawyers in a revolutionary
piece of legislation, the present writer will consider himself repaid.
G. C. Cheshire.
Oxford, England.

